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L Introduction
A litigant preparing for oral arguments before the Supreme Court has
reached the final step in an expensive and time-consuming appellate process.
Based on the ability of the attorneys to convince five Justices of the merits of a
particular legal argument, one litigant's rights will be adjudicated and often a
broad constitutional question will be answered. But what happens when one
party becomes concerned that the Court's decision might be based not on the
strength of the legal reasoning, but rather on some external interest of one or
more of the Justices? To avoid the appearance of bias in those types of cases, a
Supreme Court Justice is required to recuse himself from any case in which the
Justice's participation would create a reasonable apprehension that he would
not act impartially.1
The difficulty lies in identifying what situations support that type of
apprehension. For example, should a Supreme Court Justice be disqualified
from a case argued by his former law partner? What about a case on a topic
that the Justice has already discussed in Congressional testimony? Should a
Justice participate in a case against a member of the executive branch with
whom the Justice had recently vacationed? In these three situations-the most
controversial recusal cases in the Supreme Court during the last sixty years-
Justices Black, Rehnquist, and Scalia, respectively, held that recusal was not
required.2
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000) (describing the situations when judges must recuse
themselves from a given case). At the outset it is important to note that the terms recusal and
disqualification once carried distinct meaning; in this Note, as is predominantly the case today,
the two terms are used interchangeably. See John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In
Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 43, 45 (1970) (noting the difference
between recusal and disqualification).
2. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 929 (2004) (Scalia, J., as
single Justice) (rejecting recusal motion based on recent travel with Vice President Cheney);
Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 839 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., as single Justice) (rejecting recusal
motion that was based on his professional experience at the Department of Justice); Jewell
Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 897,897 (1945) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (discussing Justice Black's decision to sit in the case), denying reh "g of325 U.S.
161. Although these three cases present the most famous recusal dilemmas in the last sixty
years, disqualification is not a problem reserved to the modem Court. One of the first instances
of a Supreme Court Justice sitting in a case where propriety might counsel for recusal was Chief
Justice Marshall's role in deciding Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In
Marbury, Marshall crafted the Court's opinion in a case that arose directly from his own failure
to perform duties as Secretary of State prior to taking his seat on the Supreme Court. See id. at
153-54; JOHN P. MACKENzIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 1 (1974) (noting the entanglement
problems presented by Justice Marshall's ruling in Marbury). Scholars have attributed the
difference between historical and modem recusal to changes in public standards. See Frank,
supra note 1, at 43 (explaining differing outcomes as the result of changing law and attitudes).
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The uproar that accompanied these decisions is indicative of public
dissatisfaction with recusal policy in the Supreme Court.3 The widespread
criticism of Justice Scalia's recent denial of a motion to recuse himself4 shows
that, despite extensive academic and Congressional interest over the past sixty
years,5 today's process is not successful at producing predictable results.
Although development and adoption of a concrete mechanism for recusal is by
no means a simple task, the vital role that disqualification plays in preserving
the appearance of judicial impartiality requires that a solution to recusal in the
Supreme Court be found. Using the facts of Justice Scalia's March 2004
decision as a convenient test case, this Note seeks to propose such a solution.
The recusal challenge to Justice Scalia emerged from a suit filed by the
Sierra Club in April 2002.6 The Sierra Club alleged that the National Energy
Policy Development Group (NEPDG), an organization established by President
Bush to develop a cohesive national energy policy and chaired by Vice
President Cheney, had violated federal law by having nongovernment
employees participating as de facto members.7 The district court entered a
discovery order requiring Vice President Cheney and other senior Executive
Branch officials to produce meeting minutes and other materials tending to
show the structure and membership of the NEPDG.8 The circuit court denied
3. See MAcKENzIE, supra note 2, at 209 (calling Justice Rehnquist's decision in Laird
"one of the most serious ethical lapses in the Court's history"); John P. Frank, Disqualification
of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 607 (1947) (mentioning the criticism levied against Justice Black
for his role in Jewell Ridge); Editorial, Justice in a Bind, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 2004, at A12
(calling Justice Scalia's recusal decision "unbecoming," "angry," and "dismissive").
4. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 929 (2004) (denying the
Sierra Club's motion for recusal).
5. See Frank, supra note 1, at 67 (supporting a proposal to modify 28 U.S.C. § 455);
Note, Disqualification ofJudges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736,750
(1973) (encouraging adoption of provisions from the modified ABA Code of Judicial Conduct);
Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and Sen.
Joseph I. Lieberman, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, to Hon.
William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States (Jan. 22, 2004), at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/scotus/leahyrehnql22041tr.html (last visited August 31,
2005) [hereinafter Leahy Letter] (writing to inquire about Justice Scalia's trip and the Court's
mechanisms for considering motions to recuse) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
6. See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 913-17 (describing the relationship between the motion to
recuse and the Sierra Club's suit against Vice President Cheney and the NEPDG).
7. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367,372-75 (2004) (describing the
claims of the respondent Sierra Club in its underlying suit); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy
Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussing the claims in the
consolidated lawsuits against Vice President Cheney and the NEPDG).
8. See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 375-76 (explaining the scope of the district court's decision).
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the government defendants' subsequent appeal for mandamus relief from the
discovery order, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 9
In March 2004, prior to oral arguments before the Court, the Sierra Club
submitted a motion to disqualify Justice Scalia claiming that his recent duck-
hunting vacation with Vice President Cheney had created a reasonable
apprehension of bias.'0 The two men traveled aboard the Vice President's
official aircraft to Louisiana where they joined a group of thirteen others for a
week of hunting and fishing." According to Justice Scalia's description of the
facts, his time in the hunting camp only overlapped with the Vice President for
two days of the trip, and during that period, they had no private moments
together. 12 When details of the event came to light, however, newspapers
nationwide were quick to assert that the hunting trip raised the specter of
judicial bias and urged Justice Scalia to recuse himself from the matter.' 3 In
fact, the Sierra Club cited the press outcry as primary evidence of how Justice
Scalia's vacation had created an appearance of partiality.'
4
In a rare memorandum opinion, Justice Scalia declined to recuse himself
and explained the facts and legal reasoning supporting his decision.' 5 After
describing the actual circumstances of the hunting trip,16 Justice Scalia rejected
the Sierra Club's contention that Justices must resolve any question of bias in
favor of recusal.17 Unlike a recusal motion to a circuit court of appeals, where
an alternate judge could replace one who is disqualified, the lack of substitute
Justices for the Supreme Court counseled against recusal.'
8
Justice Scalia further found that the Sierra Club had failed to show any
reasonable basis for an apprehension of bias. 9 Construing the motion as a
9. See id. at 376 (reviewing the circuit court's decision).
10. See Motion to Recuse at 2, Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004)
(No. 03-475), available at 2004 WL 397220 (requesting Justice Scalia's recusal on the basis of
his impartiality being called into question).
11. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 914-15 (2004) (describing
travel arrangements, duration of trip, and number of participants).
12. See id. at 915 (detailing Vice President Cheney's travel schedule).
13. See, e.g., Editorial, Justice in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,2004, at A12 (criticizing
Justice Scalia's decision to sit in the Cheney matter).
14. See Motion to Recuse at 5-7,9, Cheney (No. 03-475) (citing various press clippings).
15. See generally Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., as
single Justice).
16. See id. at 914-15 (providing details of Justice Scalia's duck hunting vacation to
Louisiana).
17. See id. at 915-16 (rejecting the necessity to favor recusal).
18. See id. (explaining the difficulties created by recusal at the Supreme Court level and
claiming that recusal is effectively "a vote against the petitioner").
19. See id. at 926-27 (stating that recusal is improper because impartiality cannot
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charge that his apparent friendship with the Vice President presented a
reasonable apprehension of bias, Justice Scalia noted that friendship was not a
traditional ground for recusal when the official action of the purported friend is
at issue.20 The existence of potential political ramifications from a negative
legal outcome, Justice Scalia continued, does not prevent a judge from
distinguishing between official action and private action suits. 2' Justice Scalia
also emphatically denied that the weight of popular press opinion could be
sufficient to sway his decision in favor of recusal.22 Finally, Justice Scalia
declared that "a system that assumes [judges] to be corruptible by the slightest
friendship or favor" undermines public confidence in judicial integrity at least
as much as the appearance of slight improprieties.23 Concluding that no person
who believed in Justice Scalia's impartiality prior to the duck-hunting trip
could reasonably be swayed from his position by that event alone, Justice Scalia
denied the Sierra Club's motion for recusal.24
Determining whether recusal is required in a given situation is a matter of
applying the standard for deciding questions of apparent bias to the facts, a task
that Justice Scalia performed within the limits of the Supreme Court's current
policy. This Note's assignment, therefore, is to improve both the standard for
recusal and the procedure by which that standard is applied. The first analytical
step, discussed in Part II, is to review the ways in which disqualification
advances important policy interests and assess how the federal recusal statute
has developed to serve those interests. In Part 1II, this Note focuses on the
recusal procedures and standards developed by other common law nations'
courts of last resort and seeks to highlight the similarities and differences
between the Supreme Court's approach and the approaches taken by peer
judicial systems. After analyzing that international guidance, Part IV makes a
proposal for an improved recusal standard and procedure for Supreme Court
Justices. Finally, Part V will apply the new proposal to the facts of Justice
Scalia's recusal decision and assess the propriety of his determination.
reasonably be questioned).
20. See id. at 926-27 (noting that many Justices reach the Supreme Court because of a
relationship with members of the executive branch and that those executive branch members are
often named as parties to lawsuits in their official capacities).
21. See id. at 917-20 (rejecting the claim that particular circumstances modified the
traditional presumption against recusal in these cases).
22. See id. at 928-29 (expressing concern that the public would think a Justice
"corruptible" and his influence "cheap" to acquire); see also TV Comm. Network, Inc. v. ESPN,
Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (D. Colo. 1991) (stating that press reports cannot "serve as a
barometer for the reasonable observer standard").
23. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913,928 (2004).
24. See id. at 929 (characterizing the issue and denying the motion for recusal).
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I. Domestic Recusal Policy & Procedure in the Supreme Court
Disqualifying judges from cases in which they might not be impartial is
not a new phenomenon. Preservation of judicial impartiality has been a
hallmark of legal systems since the adoption of the Magna Carta,2 5 and the
United States has made provisions for recusal of judges since 1792.26
Disqualification for bias, however, was not codified until 1911 and then only
through a statute that applied strictly to federal district court judges.27 The lack
of statutory guidance meant that disqualification in the Supreme Court was left
to tradition and to the conscience and ethics of individual Justices. 8 The result,
as one might expect, is an inconsistent body of recusal decisions that provides
little guidance as to what policy or procedure might be applied in future
circumstances.29
A. Policy Interests Underlying Judicial Recusal
Consistent application of recusal standards and procedure is important
because judicial impartiality is a central expectation of our legal system. °
Disqualification advances that purpose first by preserving actual fairness in the
adjudication of disputes.3 1 The Constitution guarantees an independent and
impartial hearing in federal courts,32 and the Supreme Court has established
25. See Andrew Field, Confirming the Parting of Ways: The Law of Bias and the
Automatic Disqualification Rule in England and Australia, 2001 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 388,
388-89 (commenting on the historic roots of the principle that justice is best administered by an
independent and impartial tribunal).
26. See Litekyv. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544 (1994) (commenting on the history of
judicial recusal).
27. See id. (discussing adoption of the predecessor statute to 28 U.S.C. § 144).
28. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 897,
897 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (mentioning that determining the propriety of withdrawal
has always been considered the responsibility of each Justice), denying reh 'g of 325 U.S. 161.
29. See, e.g., Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451,466-67 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., statement) (recusing himself from a case in which he was a "victim of the practice" of music
on public buses, the subject of the case before the Court); JewellRidge Coal Corp., 325 U.S. at
897 (declaring that the Justices' "[p]ractice has not been uniform" and has "doubtless [led] to
some confusion").
30. See Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (stating that "justice must satisfy
the appearance ofjustice"); Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the
Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 543, 543 (1994) (noting that "U]udicial impartiality is a significant
element of justice").
31. See Note, supra note 5, at 746 (discussing the interests protected by judicial
disqualification).
32. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)
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that due process requires that disputes be adjudicated by a judge without any
pecuniary or other interest in the outcome.33 Fortunately, the mandatory recusal
statutes already in place are quite explicit and effective at eliminating actual
bias from the federal court system.34
Disqualification also serves a second, equally vital interest: preservation
of the apparent fairness and impartiality of the federal courts.35 As Justice Felix
Frankfurter explained, it is central to a free and open judicial system that "the
administration ofjustice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as
be so in fact."36 Because the judiciary derives authority from the public's belief
in the reasoned foundation of its decisions, and because decisions stained with
apparent bias undermine that belief, "justice must not only be done but
manifestly must be seen to be done. 3 7 Mandatory and discretionary recusal of
judges enhances the image ofjudicial fairness and promotes public confidence
in the judicial process.38
Unfortunately, no recusal policy can satisfy everyone; if, as Justice
Rehnquist commented, even "fair minded judges might disagree" about recusal
under a particular set of facts, it is unlikely that any system will satisfy all
interested parties.39 On the other hand, concrete recusal standard and procedure
would at least ensure that the determination process itself is not subject to
(explaining the protections of Article III, § 1 of the Constitution); Gregory Wicker, Comment,
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority: Judicial Incursions Into
Executive Power, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1555, 1582 (2004) (calling the right of litigants to
impartial judges one of the "purposes" of Article III).
33. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (declaring that due process is
violated by subjecting an individual to a hearing before a judge with a substantial interest in
reaching a decision against that individual).
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2000) (requiring mandatory recusal in certain factual
situations); Note, supra note 5, at 746 (noting that preservation of actual fairness does not
require application of stricter standards for judges).
35. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921)
(commenting that the action of law must not hint of "prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim
or fitfulness"); Note, supra note 5, at 746 (discussing the interest of maintaining public
confidence in the "integrity of the judicial process").
36. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
statement).
37. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 n.19 (1951)
(discussing the importance of generating the feeling that justice has been done); Note, supra
note 5, at 746-47 (commenting on the interplay between public confidence and judicial
authority).
38. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 870-72 (1988)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the intended purpose of a system for replacing judges
challenged due to an appearance of bias).
39. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 836 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., as single Justice).
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accusations of impropriety.40 As seven sitting Justices have noted, advance
expressions of recusal policy and procedure help reduce accusations that later
determinations were the product of unique characteristics of those individual
cases. 41 Whatever the outcomes of individual decisions, an explicit recusal
policy makes members of the public confident that recusal determinations are
based on an established and approved formula.
Finally, as Justices Rehnquist and Scalia have both specifically mentioned,
recusal of a Justice presents the risk of affirmation by an equally divided
Supreme Court.42 Equally divided decisions result in affirmation of the
underlying circuit court determination, limited to the exact facts of the specific
case before the Court.43 Although some commentators have argued that
affirmation by an equally divided Court does not present serious concerns, 44
such a decision has two significant effects: denying the petitioner a decision on
the instant action and denying the system a legal determination on one or more
issues that were significant enough to warrant a grant of certiorari.45 These
concerns demonstrate the importance of a recusal policy that minimizes
unnecessary disqualification of Justices.
B. Enactment and Development of the Federal Recusal Statute
The development of a recusal standard for the Supreme Court started in
1948 when Congress tried to alleviate the confusion surrounding
disqualification by enacting a federal recusal statute applicable to all federal
judges.4  The new law, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 455, listed three factual
40. See Editorial, Judicial Ethics Under Review, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at A28
(calling for an improved procedure for determining and enforcing recusal decisions).
41. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST ET AL., STATEMENT OF RECUSAL POLIcY (Nov. 1, 1993),
reprinted at 124 S. Ct., Orders, at 52-55 (explaining the value of determining and announcing
recusal policy in advance).
42. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915-16 (2004) (Scalia, J., as
single Justice) (expressing concerns over decisions affirmed by an equally divided Supreme
Court); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837-38 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., as single Justice) (same).
43. See 5 AM. JuR. 2D Appellate Review § 892 (2004) (stating that "affirmance by an
equally divided United States Supreme Court is a judgment not entitled to precedential
weight"); Note, supra note 5, at 749 (stating that decisions of an equally divided Court "make
no law except with regard to the precise facts" of that dispute).
44. See Note, supra note 5, at 749 (calling the appealing party "slightly disadvantaged" by
having to persuade five of eight, instead of five of nine, justices).
45. See id. at 748-50 (discussing the effects on the petitioners and on the legal system of
an equally divided Court).
,46. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948) (encoding recusal requirements for federal judges); 28
U.S.C. § 451 (1948) (defining "justice" as "the Associate Justices and the Chief Justice of the
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situations when recusal would be mandatory, plus a discretionary provision
recommending that a justice disqualify himself "whenever, in [the judge's]
opinion, [the judge's] impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
47
Although § 455 was applied successfully for almost thirty years, Justice
Rehnquist's application of the standard in response to a motion to disqualify
him in Laird v. Tatum4 8 generated significant controversy and, at least in part,
led to changes in the federal disqualification statute.49
At approximately the same time, the American Bar Association approved
a revamped Code of Judicial Conduct (Code), the first update to its code for
judges in nearly fifty years.50 One of the main motivations for changing the
Code was to provide more complete guidance to judges making recusal
determinations. 51 This type of guidance meant providing descriptions of
United States Supreme Court").
47. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948). The three factual situations which required disqualification
were cases in which the judge (1) had a substantial interest, (2) had been of counsel, or (3) had
been a material witness. Id.
48. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 825 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., as single Justice)
(declaring that 28 U.S.C. § 455 was the governing statute). As Assistant Attorney General prior
to his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist had provided testimony before a
congressional committee in which he addressed the legal issue presented in Laird and
mentioned that case by name. Id. at 824-28. The issue was whether Justice Rehnquist's
appearance and testimony mandated his recusal from Laird pursuant to § 455. Id. at 825.
Rehnquist first determined that any such determination rested solely with him Id. at 824. Next,
he explained that his role at the Department of Justice had not been as counsel or material
witness in Laird and concluded that the mandatory provisions of § 455 were not applicable. Id.
at 828. Finally, addressing the possibility of discretionary disqualification, Justice Rehnquist
declared that existence of some prior opinion on a legal issue could not reasonably create an
appearance of impartiality. Id. at 835-37. Because disqualification was neither required nor
recommended under § 455, Justice Rehnquist denied the motion. Id. at 839.
49. See MAcKENZIE, supra note 2, at 209 (declaring Justice Rehnquist's decision in Laird
to be a serious ethical lapse); Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1972, at 46 (criticizing Justice
Rehnquist's decision in Laird); see also Note, supra note 5, at 736 (stating that "Justice
Rehnquist provoked a great deal of controversy by refusing to disqualify himself").
50. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1) (1972) (establishing that "[a] judge
should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned"). Interestingly, in his denial of the motion to recuse in Laird v. Tatum, Justice
Rehnquist dismissed the updated ABA Code as identical to the 1948 version of the federal
recusal statute despite clear and substantial differences between the two. See Laird, 409 U.S. at
825 (Rehnquist, J., as single Justice) (declining to consider the ABA Code because of its
similarity to § 455); Note, supra note 5, at 744 (stating that Justice Rehnquist dismissed the
ABA Code as indistinguishable).
51. See E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 60 (1973)
(explaining the shortcomings of previous Canons of Judicial Ethics).
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specific situations that would require disqualification and a discretionary
standard to apply to new factual circumstances.
52
The 1972 Model Code drafting committee, which included Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart, considered two standards to apply to questions of bias.53
The first was the "substantial threat" standard,54 which involved a
determination of whether the extent of a judge's relationship with the case
presented a "substantial threat to his impartiality. "55 The purpose of the
substantial threat standard was to ensure that a judge who was actually biased
would not be able to serve.56 The second standard, and the one eventually
adopted, was the "reasonable person" standard. 57  Under that objective
standard, the Code declares that a judge should recuse himself whenever his
impartiality "might reasonably be questioned., 58 In other words, if a judge
believes that a reasonable person, with full knowledge of the facts and
circumstances in question, would have doubts about the judge's impartiality,
then disqualification is proper.59
In 1974, Congress modified 28 U.S.C. § 455 "to broaden and clarify the
grounds for judicial disqualification"' 6 and to bring the federal statute in line
with the modified ABA Code of Judicial Conduct.61 The "massive changes"
undertaken by the 1974 amendment included delineation of additional
52. See id at 60-68 (discussing the four specific standards and the general standard).
53. See Note, supra note 5, at 742 n.26 (identifying membership of the drafting
committee).
54. See Donald T. Weckstein, Introductory Observations on the Code of Judicial
Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 785, 792 (1972) (describing discussion of the two tests by the
American Association of Law Schools committee).
55. Note, supra note 5, at 745.
56. See id. (detailing the purpose of the substantial threat standard).
57. See id (describing the general test for disqualification and how it should be
measured).
58. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(l) (1972).
59. See Note, supra note 5, at 745 (discussing the ABA standard and the policies behind
it). There appear to be two chief reasons why the ABA decided to adopt its standard. The first
goal was to ensure that no judge with bias actually participates in the case. Id. Second, the
ABA wanted to also guarantee that no reasonable person could suspect that the judge was
partial. Id. Although the substantial threat standard would protect the first goal, the interest in
maintaining an appearance of impartiality could only be protected by the more stringent
reasonable person standard. Id.
60. See Act ofDec. 5,1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, cmt., 88 Stat. 1609,1609 (amending 28
U.S.C. § 455 (1948)) (expressing the purpose for changes to § 455 to be "to broaden and clarify
the grounds for judicial disqualification").
61. See H.R. REp. No. 93-1453, at 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351,6353
(explaining that the amended bill will generally conform with the modified standards of the
Code of Judicial Conduct).
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circumstances when recusal would be mandatory and, most importantly,
modification of the standard for discretionary recusal.62 The modified statute,
codified as 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), required that "[a]nyjustice, judge, or magistrate
judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned., 63 What made the 1974
revision so significant was the conversion from a subjective, "in [the judge's]
opinion" standard for recusal to an objective, "reasonable person" standard.64
The modified standard was a major improvement for protection of public
confidence and mirrored the standard proposed by the American Bar
65Association.
The Supreme Court first considered § 455(a) in Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp.66  The chief issue in Liljeberg was whether a
62. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 546 (1994) (summarizing changes to the
federal recusal statute).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000). The version of § 455 adopted in 1974 is still in effect
today, save for a few minor amendments. See Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 1007, 102 Stat. 4642,4667 (codified at § 455(f)) (providing for a judge to remain on a case in
which significant judicial time has been invested if the judge divests himself of the grounds for
disqualification); Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 214, 92 Stat. 2549, 2661
(removing references to referees in bankruptcy from § 455).
64. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988)
(explaining that § 455(a) was designed to replace the subjective standard with an objective
standard); H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355
(describing the proposed legislation as adopting an objective standard).
65. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1) (1972) (supporting a reasonable person
standard); see also supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing ABA standard).
Although the ABA updated its Model Code in 1990, the standard for discretionary
disqualification remained unchanged in its most recent form. See ABA MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (2000) (supporting a reasonable person standard).
66. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 850 (stating that certiorari was granted to consider
construction of § 455(a)). In Lijeberg, the Supreme Court considered the application of
§ 455(a) in a case in which the challenged trial judge was unaware of the existence of a
pecuniary interest in the matter prior to delivering his decision. Id at 858. The Court also faced
a question of appropriate remedy for a finding of apparent bias under § 455(a) when the
challenged judge did not discover a violation until after the judgment had become final. Id,
The petitioner in Lijeberg was the corporate successor to a health management company that
had entered into an agreement with the respondent for the purpose of establishing a hospital in
Kenner, Louisiana. Id. at 853-54. The respondent, who was at the time also involved in
negotiations with Loyola University for a piece of property on which to build the proposed
hospital, received a required "certificate of need" from state authorities but refused to transfer
the certificate to petitioner. Id. Petitioner filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief, and the
matter was tried before Federal District Court Judge Robert Collins, a member of the Loyola
University Board of Trustees. Id. at 850, 855. At the time the matter was pending before Judge
Collins, he was unaware that the University and respondent Liljeberg were involved in
negotiations. Id. at 855-56. After delivering a ruling favoring the respondent on March 16,
1982, Judge Collins became aware of the relationship between the University and Liljeberg
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reasonable apprehension of bias could develop if the judge was not conscious
67of the facts that would create such an appearance. The Court adopted the
Fifth Circuit's holding that the test for apprehension of bias was applied from
the perspective of "a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances."
68
Although the Court did not define the reasonable person standard, the decision
demonstrated elevated sensitivity in the test's application. 69 By vacating the
trial judge's decision on the basis of apprehended bias despite the minimal
likelihood of actual bias, the Supreme Court emphasized its "guiding
consideration... that the administration ofjustice should reasonably appear to
be disinterested as well as be[ing] so in fact.
70
The Supreme Court again dealt with 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) in Liteky v.
United States,71 a case concerning the source of information giving rise to an
apprehension of bias. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained that the
1974 revisions to § 455 created a new catchall provision that emphasized
evaluation of all claims of bias on an objective basis.72 The simple and
universal rule was that "recusal was required 'whenever impartiality might
while preparing for a Board of Trustees' meeting on March 24, 1982. Id. The Supreme Court,
affirming the Fifth Circuit's decision, held that Judge Collins had a duty to disqualify himself
and vacate his ruling as soon as he discovered the relationship between Loyola and Liljeberg.
Id. at 866-67.
67. See id. at 858 (discussing the need to determine § 455(a)'s applicability).
68. Id. at 861.
69. See id. at 860-61 (considering and applying the reasonable person standard without
defining the term).
70. Id. at 869-70 (citing Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., statement)).
71. Litekyv. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). The Court inLiteky considered whether
a reasonable apprehension of bias must be grounded on extrajudicial statements of the judge.
Id. at 541. The petitioners in Liteky, charged with vandalism on the federally owned grounds of
Fort Benning Military Reservation, claimed that the trial judge's previous interaction with the
petitioners presented a reasonable apprehension of bias. Id. at 542. The judge, petitioners
claimed, displayed "impatience, disregard for the [petitioners], and animosity" during a 1983
trial for misdemeanors committed during a protest at the same military installation. Id. at 542-
43. The district court and the Eleventh Circuit denied petitioners' motion on the grounds that
"matters arising from judicial proceedings" were not a proper basis for a recusal motion. Id at
543. The Supreme Court agreed, endorsing the application of the extrajudicial source doctrine
to § 455(a). Id. at 554. The Court emphasized, however, that an extrajudicial source was
neither a necessary condition for a finding of bias nor was such a source sufficient to make a
prima facie showing of bias. Id. at 554-55. The Court concluded that judicial rulings were
rarely able to support an apprehension of bias unless it was possible to show that the judge
relied on extrajudicial sources in making his or her determination, and relied on them to a
degree demonstrating favoritism or antagonism that would "make fair judgment impossible." Id.
at 555.




reasonably be questioned.' 7 3  Justice Scalia noted that the question of
reasonableness must be addressed with the understanding that an expectation of
"child-like innocence" was unreasonable.74 A certain amount of external
knowledge is inescapable; the issue when applying § 455 is whether an
apprehension of a wrongful or inappropriate disposition is reasonable in the
context of a particular proceeding.75
Chief Justice Rehnquist offered some perspective on § 455(a) recusal in
conjunction with an application for certiorari in Microsoft Corp. v. United
States.76 According to Justice Rehnquist, an inquiry into appearance of bias or
prejudice is "made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is
informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances."7 7 He decided that no
"well-informed" and "objective" observer would find that an appearance of
impropriety existed in the case.78 Providing such a "broad sweep" to § 455(a),
Justice Rehnquist concluded, was contrary to the reasonable person standard
embodied in the statute.79
C. The Reasonable Observer
Having an objective standard is only useful if judges understand what
"reasonable" means in the context of recusal decisions; to that end, every circuit
court of appeals has adopted some form of a "reasonable person" standard. 0
The standard applied must balance two serious risks: an excessively deferential
standard risks eroding public confidence in the face of decisions by apparently
73. Id.
74. See id. at 552 (discussing the definition of impartiality).
75. See id. at 550 (explaining that bias in § 455 does not contemplate all unfavorable
dispositions, only an unfavorable disposition that is inappropriate because of its source).
76. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301,1301 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., as
single Justice) (describing his consideration of whether his disqualification was required). In
Microsoft, the petitioners were seeking appellate review of a negative antitrust finding in the
circuit court. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist's son was an attorney with a firm who represented the
petitioning party in other antitrust matters. Id. at 1302. The question addressed was whether the
decision denying certiorari had a sufficient effect on the financial circumstances of the Chief
Justice's son to warrant his recusal under § 455. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that
the relationship in Microsoft between his son's antitrust practice and the antitrust issue before
the Court was too attenuated to support disqualification. Id.
77. Id. at 1302 (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)).
78. See id. at 1302-03 (explaining that the potential connection between the issue before
the court and his interest in the outcome was too attenuated).
79. Id. at 1303.
80. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECUSAL: ANALYsIs OF CASE LAW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 &
144, pt. L.IV.A, at 15 (2002).
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biased judges, but an excessively stringent standard risks development of a
system of judge-shopping that would undermine confidence that judicial
outcomes are independent of the decisionmaker.8 l Although the Supreme
Court has not adopted a specific description of the reasonable person
contemplated by § 455(a), the outlines of the objective standard can be drawn
from the positions of the circuit courts.82
Much of the case law discussing the standard is concerned with explaining
that the reasonable person is, at the very least, not ajudge.83 The Fourth Circuit
has made clear that a judge's perspective is inappropriate because judges are
more aware of the obligation to judge impartially.8 4 Applying the test from a
judge's perspective would likely result in seeing conflicts as more "innocuous"
than would an outsider to the judicial system. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits
have noted that outsiders are "less likely to credit judges' impartiality and
mental discipline" than would members of the judiciary or the legal
profession. 86 A reasonable person standard that embodies the slightly less
deferential perspective of the general public seems to be a logical outgrowth of
the change from subjective to objective review under the amended § 455(a).
Although the reasonable person does not have the same faith in judicial
impartiality as a judge might have, neither does the standard contemplate a
person who "see[s] goblins behind every tree. 8 7 The circuit courts agree that a
reasonable person is not "hypersensitive or unduly suspicious" because there is
always some (albeit miniscule) degree of risk that a judge will ignore the merits
of a case.88 As Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has noted, "[t]rivial
risks are endemic, and if they were enough to require disqualification we would
81. See In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) (debating the nature of the
objective standard and the risk of excessive sensitivity to perceived partiality).
82. The closest that the Supreme Court has come to defining the standard in this context is
probably the description in Liljeberg of a "reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances."
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 (1988). This is, at best, the
minimum requirement for the reasonable person standard; it seems obvious that the drafters of
§ 455(a) did not contemplate a person with only a speculative understanding of the factual
circumstances underlying the claim.
83. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 80, pt. 1.IV.A, at 16-19 (discussing the positions
of the various circuit courts of appeals).
84. See United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998) (considering the
hypothetical reasonable observer).
85. Id.
86. See In re Mason, 916 F.2d at 386 (considering the reasonable person standard); see
also United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995) (same).
87. In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990).




have a system of preemptory strikes and judge-shopping" that would
thoroughly undermine the judicial system.89
Although these broad strokes help discern the reasonableness standard in
the federal courts, there is a lot of middle ground between hypersensitivity and
giving excessive credit to judges.90 The Seventh Circuit defines the reasonable
person standard in terms of a "thoughtful" and "well-informed observer."91 The
Fifth Circuit has suggested that the viewpoint of an "average person on the
street" is the most effective perspective from which to apply the standard.92
The First Circuit found recusal appropriate when the facts create in the mind of
an "objective, knowledgeable member of the public" a reasonable basis for
doubting the judge's impartiality.93 Fortunately, the diversity of terminology
has had little impact on courts' approaches to the standard.
94
A more understandable recusal policy for the Supreme Court would help
provide clear guidance to federal judges at the district and circuit court levels.
Under the current system of convoluted standards, memorandum opinions, and
unwritten procedure, persuasive legal precedent is emerging from the Supreme
Court. 95 Unfortunately, that precedent arrives without the benefit of en banc
consideration by the Supreme Court. A clear standard and settled procedure
would ensure that Supreme Court guidance on recusal questions was the
product of serious consideration by a majority of the Court.
D. Determinative Procedure for Recusal Motions in the Supreme Court
The "historic practice" of the United States Supreme Court has always
been to refer motions for recusal to the Justice whose disqualification is
sought.96 Thus, although the standard for recusal has received significant
89. In re Mason, 916 F.2d at 386.
90. See Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's
Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned", 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETMIcs 55, 72-73 (2000)
(discussing the various interpretations of the reasonable person standard adopted by state
courts).
91. In re Mason, 916 F.2d at 386.
92. Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980).
93. In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981).
94. See Abramson, supra note 90, at 73 (describing the uniform approach of state courts
to the reasonable person standard in spite of widely varying definitions).
95. See United States v. Bobo, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1241 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (citing
Justice Scalia's recusal opinion in making a determination for disqualification).
96. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 540 U.S. 1217, 1217 (2004) (referring
recusal motion); see also Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301, 1301 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., as
single Justice) (explaining that the Court generally leaves such motions to the individual
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judicial attention, the actual procedure by which the decision is made is truly a
creature of tradition.97 In fact, the only statement ever issued by the Court
regarding recusal practice touched only on the disqualification standards
adopted by seven Justices for situations in which a child was a member of a
firm arguing before the Court.98 It is indicative of the lack of legal discussion
on this topic that the "Recuse" entry in a noted Supreme Court reference
volume totals two sentences. 99 Although there is reason to believe that recusal
determinations are at least partially the product of judicial discussion,' °° the
lack of concrete policy undermines the appearance of impartiality that recusal is
supposed to protect.
IlI. Recusal Policy in Foreign Courts of Last Resort
The expectation ofjudicial impartiality is a hallmark of most modem legal
systems. In fact, resolution of disputes by an unbiased tribunal has been
characterized as a fundamental human right.'0 ' Foreign law and precedent have
grown increasingly influential in American courts,10 2 a development supported
by many modem and historic Supreme Court Justices. 0 3 In recent years, courts
Justices); United States v. Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 695 (1960) (explaining that
recusal determinations are often left to the "conscience and good taste" of the particular judge
concerned).
97. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 897,
899 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (commenting on the absence of an established procedure
for deciding recusal motions to Supreme Court Justices), denying reh "g of325 U.S. 161.
98. See REHNQUIST ET AL., supra note 41 (adopting a recusal policy for situations
involving relatives of the Justices).
99. See THE OxFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 712
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992) (describing recusal in the Supreme Court). By way of contrast,
the entry on unconfirmed Supreme Court nominee John Meredith Read, nominated by President
Tyler in 1845, occupies two paragraphs. Id. at 709.
100. See An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REv. 1033,
1039 (2004) [hereinafter Ginsburg] (commenting that recusal decisions are reached with
"consultation" between the Justices).
101. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10, in THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPENDIUM OF UNITED NATIONS
NORMS AND STANDARDS 52 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 1994) (declaring that everyone has a right
to a fair and impartial tribunal); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14,
para. 1, in supra, at 13 (same).
102. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The United States Constitution and International
Law: International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (2004) (considering the
growing impact of international law on U.S. constitutional law).
103. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(affirming the role of international law in judicial construction of domestic legislation);
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of last resort in several peer common law nations have directly addressed the
issue of recusal standards and procedures °4 The framework of a generally
accepted policy for deciding recusal motions, in terms of both judicial
procedure and cognizable standards, has emerged from high court decisions in
a number of overseas jurisdictions. A review of the conclusions reached by
those bodies provides valuable persuasive guidance in formulating an effective
direction for policy in our Supreme Court.
A. The Supreme Court of Canada
10 5
As is the case in the United States, motions for discretionary
disqualification of ajustice of the Supreme Court of Canada are infrequent.
10 6
Procedurally, the determination of such a motion in the Supreme Court of
Canada is very similar to the procedure in the United States Supreme Court.
The moving party submits the request for recusal directly to the justice whose
disqualification is sought.10 7 That justice, after considering whether the facts as
described create a reasonable apprehension of bias, rules on the motion as a
single justice.1
0 8
Ginsburg, supra note 100, at 1040-42 (discussing the advisory role international precedent can
play in domestic courts).
104. See discussion infra Part III.A-D (discussing recusal standards and procedures in
foreign courts).
105. The Supreme Court of Canada is the nation's highest court and is the last judicial
resource for litigants. The Supreme Court sits atop the four-tiered judicial system of the nation
and has final appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the federal courts of appeal and the various
provincial courts of appeal. Access to the Supreme Court is generally limited to cases for which
the Court grants leave to appeal, but the right of appeal to the Court is guaranteed in certain
criminal matters. See SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, Role of the Court, at http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/role/index e.asp (last updated Mar. 1, 2005) (providing general
information about the Supreme Court of Canada) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, The Canadian Judicial System, at http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/system/ indexe.asp (last updated Mar. 14, 2005) (explaining the Canadian
court system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
106. See BRIAN A. CRANE & HENRY S. BROWN, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA PRACTICE
2005 § 4 Recusal, at 45 (stating that "[t]he Court has had very few challenges alleging a
reasonable apprehension of bias").
107. See id. (describing the proper procedure to challenge a justice); see also Arsenault-
Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 851, 852 (Bastarche, J., as single Justice)
(deciding motion to recuse himself).
108. See Arsenault-Cameron, [ 1999] 3 S.C.R. at 852-53 (Bastarche, J., as single Justice)
(considering creation of a reasonable apprehension of bias).
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The test applied to recusal motions by Canadian justices was first
described by Justice de Grandpr6 in his dissent to Committee for Justice &
Liberty v. National Energy Board.109 Justice de Grandprd reasoned:
[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable
and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and
obtaining thereon the required information.... [T]hat test is 'what would
an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically-and
having thought the matter through-conclude. Would he think that it is
more likely than not that the judge], whether consciously or unconsciously,
would not decide fairly.' 10
This standard implicates a two-part consideration: the reasonableness of the
person considering the alleged bias and the reasonableness of the apprehension
itself."' Canadian courts have used the de Grandprd test for more than two
decades. "1
2
Under Canadian jurisprudence, a reasonable person is one with an
understanding of the role life experiences play in forming the "'stream of
tendency... which gives coherence and direction to thought and action."' 13 In
essence, the reasonable person understands that every judicial decision is
motivated by social experience and that reliance on individual perspectives is a
proper and necessary part of the judge's function." 4 As such, the reasonable
109. See Comm. for Justice & Liberty v. Nat'l Energy Bd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, 394 (de
Grandprd, J., dissenting) (describing the test for apprehension ofbias). In Committeefor Justice
& Liberty, the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed an appellate decision declaring
disqualification inappropriate in an administrative hearing regarding construction of an oil
pipeline. Id. at 373-74. The chairman of the National Energy Board, the agency tasked with
making the decision, was a former member of a study group closely associated with the
particular applicant whose proposal the plaintiff challenged at the hearing stage. Id. at 379-81.
The issue was whether the apprehension of bias standard should apply to the National Energy
Board hearings. Id. at 385. The Court concluded that the apprehension test should be applied
to the Board's decisions and held that the chairman's participation in the application process
was inappropriate. Id. at 391-92. Justice de Grandprd, dissenting, instead concluded that the
chairman's relationship must be viewed in the context of the decisionmaking body. Id. at 395
(de Grandprd, J., dissenting). Justice de Grandprd argued that because the National Energy
Board was tasked with making complicated, industry-specific application decisions, industry
experience was a desirable feature for a chairman, not a basis on which a reasonable
apprehension of bias could be founded. Id. at 396-99 (de Grandprd, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 394 (de Grandpr6, J., dissenting).
111. See R.D.S. v. The Queen, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 531 (Cory & Iacobucci, JJ.,
concurring) (discussing the two objective elements of the test).
112. See id. (applying the de Grandprd test).
113. Id. at 504 (L'Heureux-Dub6 & McLachlin, JJ., concurring) (quoting CARDozO,supra
note 35, at 112).
114. See id. at 503-04 (L'Heureux-Dub6 & McLachlin, JJ., concurring) (discussing the
importance of the reasonable person's understanding of the nature of judging); see also
1816
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person is not overly sensitive to alleged bias." 5 Furthermore, the concept of the
reasonable person is localized; it encompasses the idea of a person who is "an
informed and right-minded member of the community," both national and local,
and possesses knowledge of the history and philosophy of those communities.116
A plurality of the Supreme Court of Canada has described the reasonable person
as a member of the Canadian community who approaches questions of bias with a
"complex and contextualized understanding of the issues of the case" and who
"understands the impossibility of judicial neutrality, but demands judicial
impartiality."
117
Under Canadian common law, an apprehension of bias is reasonable if:
(1) the apprehension is based on a thorough knowledge of the facts and
circumstances; and (2) the apprehension results from a careful consideration of
those facts in light of the dispute." 8  Implicit in the assessment of the
reasonableness of an apprehension of bias is the notion that judges are capable of
impartiality and are committed to performance of their tasks in an impartial
manner." 9 Some judges have suggested that an understanding of the social and
cultural circumstances underlying both the case before a court and the facts of the
apprehension is necessary for a full knowledge of the facts.12 0 Regardless of the
exact formulation, the requirement that the apprehension be informed, rather than
based on speculation or conjecture, is essential.
12 1
CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, COMMENTARIES ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT 12 (1991) (noting that
every individual is the product of past experiences).
115. See Comm.forJustice &Liberty, [1978] 1 S.C.R. at 395 (de Grandprd, J., dissenting)
(rejecting any relation of the test to a "very sensitive or scrupulous conscience").
116. See R.D.S., [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 507-08 (L'Heureux-Dubd & McLachlin, JJ.,
concurring) (considering the community identity of the reasonable person).
117. Id. at509.
118. See Comm.for Justice & Liberty, [ 1978] 1 S.C.R. at 394 (de Grandprd, J., dissenting)
(describing the elements of the test).
119. See R.D.S. v. The Queen, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484,503 (L'Heureux-Dub6 & McLachlin,
JJ., concurring) (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941)) (stating that judges are
assumed to be conscientious, intelligent, and impartial).
120. See id. at 531 (Cory & Iacobucci, JJ., concurring) (stating that the reasonable person
is "aware of the social reality" that forms the background to the dispute).
121. See id. (declaring the importance of being informed and knowledgeable of the relevant
circumstances).
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B. The United Kingdom's House of Lords 
22
The principle underlying recusal in Canada and elsewhere was first affirmed
in England in 1852 when the House of Lords endorsed the fundamental maxim
nemo judex in sua causa: that no man may be a judge in his own cause.'
23
Although the principle initially developed only to exclude a judge from cases to
which he is actually a party, z 4 or in which he has a direct financial or pecuniary
interest,125 the House of Lords has since recognized its applicability to other
situations in which there might be a suspicion that a judge would not rule
impartially. 26 For many years, however, the application of the test to individual
situations was hampered by the lack of an understandable and easily applicable
principle.
127
The House of Lords' first effort towards establishing a modem test for
appearance of bias cases came in The Queen v. Gough.128 Lord Goff, speaking
122. Final appellate jurisdiction for certain civil and criminal disputes in the United
Kingdom lies in the House of Lords, one of the two branches of the nation's Parliament.
Individual cases are heard by an Appellate Committee made up of five randomly selected Lords
of Appeal in Ordinary, all professional judges appointed to their position in Parliament.
Judgments of the House of Lords are binding on all lower courts. See HOUSE OF LORDS
BRIEFING, THE JUDICIAL WORK OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS 1 (2005) (summarizing the makeup and
procedures of the House of Lords in its judicial role), available at http://www.parliament.uk/
documents/upload/HofLBpJudicial.pdf; THE COURT STRUCTURE OF HER MAJESTY'S COURT
SERVICE, at http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/aboutus/structure/index.htm (last updated
Mar. 31, 2005) (diagramming the position of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom's
judicial structure) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). It bears mention that a
government-supported proposal for creation of a true Supreme Court is currently under
consideration in the United Kingdom. Although there is no reason to believe that the standards
applied to disqualification questions would change, the status of disqualification procedure
under a new Court structure is unclear. See generally DEPT. OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS,
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A SUPREME COURT FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM (2003) (discussing the
proposal for a new, independent Supreme Court), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/
supremecourt/supreme.pdf.
123. See R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (In re Pinochet Ugarte) (No. 2),
[2000] 1 A.C. 119 (H.L.) (citing Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal, [1852] 3 H.L.
Cas. 759) (describing the principle); R. v. Gough, [1993] A.C. 646, 661 (H.L.) (discussing the
principle and its application in Dimes).
124. See In re Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), [2000] 1 A.C. at 133 (calling the disqualification
of a judge who is party to the suit the "starting point" of the principle).
125. See id. at 132-33 (describing the literal application of the rule and its extension to
cases in which the judge has an interest in the outcome).
126. See id. (discussing the application of the principle to cases in which a judge's
"conduct or behavior give rise to a suspicion" that the judge may be biased).
127. See Gough, [1993] A.C. at 659 (commenting on the compelling need for a readily
understandable principle).
128. See id. at 670 (formulating the test for allegations of bias). In Gough, the House of
Lords considered an appeal from a criminal conviction in a case in which a neighbor of the
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for the court, considered the two alternatives suggested by the court of appeals for
questions of bias: the "reasonable suspicion" test and the "real likelihood" test.1
29
After reviewing the somewhat mixed judicial precedent on the appropriate test to
be applied,130 Lord Goff explained that the reasonable suspicion test was an
inappropriate principle because the more rigorous real likelihood test equally
protected the appearance of judicial impartiality with less risk of unnecessary
disqualification. 131 The proper formation of the test, according to Lord Goff, was
whether the circumstances created a "real danger of bias" on the part of the
judge.'
32
Although Lord Goff's formulation was dominant for almost ten years in
England, it met with widespread criticism from England's peer legal systems,
which tended to favor tests incorporating an objective test.' 33 In light of the
weight of international precedent, and particularly the position of the European
Court of Human Rights, 34 the House of Lords in 2002 adopted a new test that
incorporated the "real suspicion" test initially rejected by Gough.135 Although the
defendant's purported accomplice had been seated on the jury. Id. at 657-58. The issue was
whether the presence of the neighbor created a possibility of bias sufficient to quash the
defendant's conviction. Id. at 658. The House of Lords, by Lord Goff, assessed the two tests
for questions of bias identified by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 660. The court first noted that
there was no need for distinct tests for allegations of potential bias against a juror versus
allegations against ajudge. Id. at 660. After considering the mixed precedent regarding which
test was preferred, Lord Goffexplained and adopted the "real danger" test. Id. at 670. Pursuant
to that conclusion, the House of Lords upheld the conviction on the grounds that the
circumstances did not create a real danger that the neighbor was not impartial. Id.
129. See id. at 660 (describing the two alternative tests used by English courts). According
to Lord Goff, the reasonable suspicion test questions whether "a reasonable and fair-minded
person, sitting in the court and knowing all the relevant facts, would have had a reasonable
suspicion" that impartiality was at risk. Id. The real likelihood test considers whether there was
a "real likelihood that the judge would.., have a bias in favor of one of the parties." Id. at 662
(citing R. v. Rand, [1866] 1 L.R.-Q.B. 230).
130. See id. at 661-70 (reviewing the decisions in English courts that address the test to
apply to questions of bias).
131. See id. at 670 (finding the reasonable man test unnecessary).
132. See id (adopting the real danger of bias test). Lord Gofffound no distinction between
a real likelihood test and a real danger test and preferred the latter characterization because he
perceived that a real danger test better emphasized the consideration of "possibility rather than
probability of bias." Id.
133. See Porter v. Magill, [2002] 2 A.C. 357, 493-94 (H.L.) (discussing the general
rejection of the Gough test by similarly situated courts); see also Webb v. The Queen, (1994)
181 C.L.R. 41, 50-51 (declining to follow Gough).
134. See Findlay v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 221,244-45 (1997) (holding that
a tribunal must be "impartial from an objective viewpoint").
135. See Porter, [2002] 2 A.C. at 493-94 (discussing the reluctance of English courts to
depart from the Gough precedent, but explaining the requirement that English courts take
European Court of Human Rights decisions into account); I.R. Scott, Case Comment, Judicial
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application of either test would likely produce the same result in most
situations, 136 the House of Lords chose to modify the Gough test to emphasize
the importance of an objective assessment of apparent bias. 137 The new test,
approved by the House of Lords, was "whether the fair-minded and informed
observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real
possibility that the tribunal was biased."138 A protracted consideration of the
characteristics of the reasonable observer was unnecessary, 139 the House of
Lords concluded, because of their confidence that lower courts applying the
standard would incorporate a person who "adopt[s] a balanced approach" to the
issue of bias. 140
Although the applicable standard for questions of bias in the United
Kingdom has received significant judicial attention, the procedure for applying
that standard remains largely a creature of tradition. 141 In England, as in the
United States and Canada, recusal determinations are made by the very judge
whose impartiality is questioned, 142 regardless of whether the judge raises the
question of perceived bias sua sponte or if he receives an objection from one of
the parties.4 3 There is reason to believe, however, that individual decisions
might be subject to review of the Court.
The House of Lords demonstrated its willingness to consider, as ajudicial
body, questions of bias in its own members during the high-profile extradition
dispute over former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.144 The question
Bias, 2003 CIV. JUST. Q. 314, 315 (noting that the House of Lords in Porter modified the test for
apparent bias to bring the test into line with European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence).
136. See Porter, [2002] 2 A.C. at 494 (commenting that application of either test would
result in the same outcome in the majority of cases).
137. See id. (explaining that the modified language expresses a test "in harmony with the
objective test" applied by the European Court of Human Rights).
138. Id.
139. See Lawal v. N. Spirit Ltd., [2004] 1 All E.R. 187, 192-93 (H.L.) (describing the
reasonable observer test and stating that it is unnecessary to "delve into the characteristics" of
the contemplated observer).
140. Id. at 193.
141. See Evadne Grant, Pinochet 2: The Questions of Jurisdiction and Bias, in THE
PINOCHET CASE: A LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 44 (Diana Woodhouse ed., 2000)
(describing the lack of formal rules and procedures).
142. See id. (stating that it is the judge against whom an objection is raised who determines
the-propriety of recusal).
143. See id (discussing the process by which a judge decides an objection to his sitting in a
case).
144. See Timothy H. Jones, Case Comment, Judicial Bias and Disqualification in the
Pinochet Case, 1999 PuB. L. 391, 391 (U.K.) (describing the incidents surrounding In re




presented in In re Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2)145 was whether the House of Lords
could set aside one of its own appellate decisions because of a subsequent claim
of apparent bias on the part of a member of the original tribunal. 146 Of the five
opinions eventually entered in the case, only Lord Browne-Wilkinson directly
addressed the jurisdiction of the House of Lords to vacate and re-hear one of its
own decisions.1 47 Browne-Wilkinson explained that the House of Lords, as the
final appellate resource for claimants, must have inherent jurisdiction to correct
"injustice" caused by one of its own orders. 148 The jurisdiction to correct
previous orders, however, must be limited to situations where the injustice is
rooted in some procedural impropriety of the court.
149
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights adds
another wrinkle to recusal determinations in the House of Lords. 150 Article Six
of the Convention states that, in both criminal and civil proceedings, a party is
145. R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (In re Pinochet Ugarte) (No. 2), [2000] 1
A.C. 119 (H.L.). In In re Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), the House of Lords was asked to set aside its
prior decision holding that Mr. Pinochet was not immune from extradition. Id. at 125-28.
Pinochet was arrested pursuant to international warrants seeking his extradition to Spain to
stand trial on charges of crimes against humanity. Id. at 125-26. In a Nov. 25, 1998 decision,
the House of Lords determined that Pinochet's immunity from prosecution for acts taken during
his tenure as head of state terminated when he ceased to be a head of state. Id. at 126. After the
decision was entered, however, it came to light that a member of the 3-2 majority in that
decision, Lord Hoffman, was a director of a charitable association closely connected with
intervener Amnesty International. Id. at 127-29. Pinochet entered a motion seeking to have the
November 25 decision vacated because of the apparent bias created by Lord Hoffman's
participation in the proceedings. Id. at 129. The court concluded that the existence of a
charitable or social interest was functionally the same as a financial or pecuniary interest, thus
producing a situation where the judge was automatically disqualified from participation. Id. at
132-35. As a result, the decision of November 25 was set aside because of the participation of a
disqualified member of the tribunal. Id. at 137.
146. See id. at 125-28 (discussing the propriety of reopening a prior decision); Jones,
supra note 144, at 391 (describing the issue considered by the House of Lords).
147. See In re Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), [2000] 1 A.C. at 132 (addressing the court's
jurisdiction); Grant, supra note 141, at 43 (noting that only one of the judges addressed the
issue directly).
148. See In re Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), [2000] 1 A.C. at 132 (explaining the principle that
the Lords have the power to correct their own errors); Grant, supra note 141, at 43 (considering
the inherent jurisdiction of the House). Browne-Wilkinson also noted that there was no
statutory limitation or judicial precedent that counseled against jurisdiction. SeeIn rePinochet
Ugarte (No. 2), [2000] 1 A.C. at 132 (discussing the authority backing jurisdiction).
149. See In re Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), [2000] 1 A.C. at 132 (limiting the situations in
which the House will reopen an appeal).
150. See generally Paul Catley & Lisa Claydon, Pinochet, Bias and the European
Convention on Human Rights, in THE PINOCHET CASE: A LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYsIs, supra note 141, at 63-77 (discussing the interplay between the Convention and the
House of Lords's decision in In re Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2)).
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entitled to a hearing before "an independent and impartial" legal tribunal. 51
This provision, combined with domestic statutory provisions creating a cause of
action against bodies which violate the Convention, has led some commentators
to suggest that a concrete procedure for recusal applications must be developed
to avoid violation of England's Convention obligations. 15
2
C. The High Court ofAustralia53
Decisions of the United Kingdom's House of Lords are very influential in
Australian courts because of the nation's inheritance of English precedent. 1
54
On the question ofjudicial bias, however, the High Court of Australia diverged
from English precedent more than twenty years ago by emphasizing the
importance of public perception in recusal determinations. 55 Emphasizing the
importance of public confidence in the judiciary, the High Court reaffirmed its
commitment to a "reasonable apprehension of bias" test in Webb v. The
Queen. 56 The Webb Court, expressly rejecting the House of Lords's recent
151. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, para. 1, in BAsIc DOCUMENTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS 401 (Ian
Brownlie & Guy S. Goodwin-Gill eds., 4th ed. 2002).
152. See Grant, supra note 141, at 59-60 (discussing the need for formal recusal procedure
to ensure compliance with European Convention on Human Rights provisions).
153. Australia, like the United States, has a judicial system with both federal and state
courts. The High Court of Australia is the highest court in the country's federal legal system
and has jurisdiction over final appeals from both the federal and state judiciaries. The High
Court is comprised of seven judges who are not required to sit en banc, but often do so in
important appeals. Like those of the United States Supreme Court, decisions of the High Court
of Australia are final and may not be overruled by the legislature or any other body. See JOHN
CARVAN, UNDERSTANDING THE AusTRALtAN LEGAL SYSTEM 47,54-55 (3d ed. 1999) (describing
the Australian judicial system).
154. See id. at 19 (discussing the sources of Australian law).
155. See Livesay v. New S. Wales Bar Ass'n, (1983) 151 C.L.R. 288,293-94 (deciding the
question of whether a judge should sit in a particular case on the basis of what impression the
"public might entertain" about the partiality of the judge).
156. See Webb v. The Queen, (1994) 181 C.L.R. 41, 50 (stating that "the reasonable
apprehension test of bias is by far the most appropriate for protecting the appearance of
impartiality"); ENID CAMPBELL & H.P. LEE, THE AusTRALIAN JuDicIARY 134 (2001) (discussing
the High Court's reasons for adhering to the reasonable apprehension test). In Webb, the High
Court was presented with the question of whether the spontaneous delivery of a bouquet of
flowers to the mother of the victim in a criminal murder trial created a sufficient bias to overturn
the defendant's conviction. Webb, (1994) 181 C.L.R. at 67. The High Court concluded that the
trial court judge's application of the "real danger" test, derived from the House of Lord's
decision in Gough was in error. Id. at 46. The proper test for questions of bias in Australia was
held to be whether the incidents would give a reasonable observer the impression that the juror
was not biased. Id. One justice noted that the underlying principle was the same regardless of
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decision in Gough,15 7 explained that the "real danger" test improperly
emphasized the court's view of the facts and attributed to the general public too
much knowledge of the law and faith in the judicial process.58
The High Court initially described the test for bias in terms of whether
"one of the parties or a fair-minded observer" would entertain a reasonable
apprehension of bias.159 Although a judge may still consider the perception of
the parties in determining questions of bias, 16° the greater emphasis is on the
perception of the hypothetical reasonable person.16' This "fictitious bystander"
is imputed with certain moderating characteristics.162 For example, the person
is not a lawyer, but is not wholly uninformed about the law. 163 Furthermore,
the bystander is "neither complacent nor unduly sensitive" and has a basic
knowledge of judicial considerations, restraints, and professional pressures.'64
Finally, the observer cannot be taken to be imbued with the characteristics of
the social majority.
165
As for the procedure for determining questions of disqualification, the
High Court of Australia, like most of its peers, has no concrete rules. 166 A party
seeking disqualification can raise the matter by letter prior to the Court's
hearing of arguments, by motion, or by objection in open court.16 7 Regardless
application to jurors, as in Webb, or application to judges. Id. at 87. The High Court concluded
that the flower incident did not give rise to a sufficient apprehension of bias as required by the
Australian rule and dismissed the defendant's appeal. Id. at 56, 88.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 128-32 (discussing the Gough decision and test
for bias).
158. See Webb, (1994) 181 C.L.R. at 50-51 (contemplating the differences between
Gough's real danger test and the reasonable appearance test).
159. See Livesay, (1983) 151 C.L.R. at 294 (explaining the situations in which an appellate
court might find a reasonable apprehension of bias).
160. See CAMPBELL & LEE, supra note 156, at 136 (describing how the reactions of a
reasonable observer are determined by Australian courts).
161. See Webb, (1994) 181 C.L.R. at 52 (noting that "the court's view of the public's
view.., is determinative").
162. See Johnson v. Johnson, (2000) 201 C.L.R. 488, 508-09 (characterizing the
reasonable observer as a "ficticious bystander").
163. See id. (describing the fictitious bystander's familiarity with the law and judges).
164. See id. (listing the attributes of the fictitious bystander).
165. See id. at 508 (stating that the bystander is not instilled with majority traits).
166. See THE OXFORD COMPANiON TO THE HIGH COURT OF AusTRAuA 214-16 (Tony
Blackshield et al. eds., 2001) (summarizing disqualification of justices in the High Court).
167. See id. at 215 (explaining the presentation of a party's disqualification challenge);
High Court Practice as to Eligibility ofJudges to Sit in a Case, 49 AUSTL. L.J. 110, 113 (1975)
(discussing the presentation of preliminary objections). In any event, it is quite clear that a
formal motion for disqualification is unnecessary. See Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth [No. 2],
(1998) 72 A.L.J.R. 1334, 1334 (Callinan, J., as single Justice) (stating that no formal motion is
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of the method of presentation, the general rule in Australia is that the
challenged judge rules on whether disqualification is appropriate. 68 Although
the Chief Judge of the High Court has the right to decide whether to accept a
decision in favor of disqualification, 169 the Chief Judge's power does not
appear to extend to requiring such decisions.
An aggrieved party facing an unfavorable recusal ruling from a High
Court judge would therefore seem to be left without any conventional
remedy. 170 The judicial drama surrounding the politically-charged Kartinyeri v.
Commonwealth (No. 2), 171 however, seems to indicate otherwise. 172 In that
case, petitioners sought en banc review of a judge's decision to not recuse
himself, and the High Court agreed to schedule a time for such a hearing.
173
Although Judge Callinan's unilateral withdrawal denied the High Court an
opportunity to hear arguments on the unprecedented appeal, 174 the arguments
presented by counsel provide persuasive and well-reasoned grounds for
believing that such an appeal could be successful. 75 Nor does the concept
necessary).
168. See CAMPBELL & LEE, supra note 156, at 146 (discussing the procedure for
determining when a judge is disqualified from sitting in a particular case).
169. See High Court Practice as to Eligibility of Judges to Sit in a Case, 49 AusTL. L.J.
110, 113 (1975) (describing the power of the Chief Justice to accept disqualification and citing
examples).
170. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 166, at
215 (discussing how no appeal is available from a decision not to disqualify).
171. See Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (No.2), (1998) 72 A.L.J.R. 1334, 1334-38
(Callinan, J., as single Justice) (considering the propriety of recusal). In the underlying case,
petitioners challenged the constitutionality of legislation which excluded a particular piece of
land from the provisions of the Heritage Protection Act. Id. at 1334. In Kartinyeri, Justice
Callinan, sitting as a single justice, ruled on plaintiffs' assertion that he should disqualify
himself because of his role in preparing a legal opinion on the constitutionality of the challenged
statute. Id. Justice Callinan had assisted in the preparation of the opinion, provided to one of
the parties to the instant action, while counsel to a legislative committee. Id. at 1334-35. After
applying the apprehension of bias test established in Webb, Callinan determined that his
advisory role did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of partiality. Id. at 1335-38.
Because of that finding, Callinan declined to disqualify himself from hearing the matter before
the Court. Id. at 1338.
172. See CAMPBELL & LEE, supra note 156, at 147 (noting that the High Court had listed
the special appeal for arguments before the full court).
173. See Sidney Tilmouth & George Williams, The High Court and the Disqualification of
One of its Own, 73 AusTL. L.J. 72, 72 (1999) (discussing the High Court's provision for
arguments before the Full Court minus Justice Callinan on the disqualification motion).
174. See THE OXFoRD COMPANION TO THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALA, supra note 166, at
215 (noting that Justice Callinan eventually disqualified himself before the appeal was argued);
Tilmouth & Williams, supra note 173, at 72 (explaining that the appeal was the first of its kind).
175. See Tilmouth & Williams, supra note 173, at 75-78 (arguing for jurisdiction on
statutory, constitutional, and natural justice grounds).
1824
DUCK DUCK RECUSE?
appear totally novel, as a former Chief Judge of the High Court has also
expressed approval for a system where disqualification motions are decided by
the other members of the Court instead of by the target judge. 1
76
D. The Constitutional Court of South Africa
177
The Constitutional Court of South Africa's decision in President of the
Republic of South Africa v. South African Rugby Football Union (SARFU)
178
involved a thorough review of common law recusal precedent, including many
of the decisions discussed above. 179 In its survey, the SARFU Court's first task
was to distill a widely accepted standard to be applied to questions of
apprehended bias in South Africa.180 After commenting on the split between
176. See CAMPBELL & LEE, supra note 156, at 148-50 (discussing Sir Anthony Mason's
argument favoring recusal determination by the judges other than the one who is the subject of
the challenge).
177. Unlike the judicial systems in the United States, Canada, and Australia, the South
African judiciary includes dual courts of last resort. The Constitutional Court is the court of last
resort for constitutional issues; the Supreme Court of Appeal serves the same purpose for
nonconstitutional disputes. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 8, §§ 167, 168 (establishing the court
system). Appeals to the Constitutional Court from lower courts are generally heard by all
eleven judges of the Court sitting en banc. Decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on
the entire judicial system and all other branches of the government. See CONSTITTMONAL
COURT OF S. AFR., ABOUT THE COURT: ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, at
http://www.concourt.gov.za/site/thecourt/role.html (last visited Sept. 2,2005) (summarizing the
role of the Constitutional Court in the South African government) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
178. Pres. of the Rep. of S. Afr. v. S. Afr. Rugby Football Union, 1999 (7) BCLR 725
(CC), 1999 SACLR LEXIS 18. In SARFU, the Constitutional Court considered and decided an
application for the recusal of four of the eleven justices of the court. 1999 SACLR LEXIS 18,
at *10. The applicant, a political rival of appellant South African President Nelson Mandela,
argued in detail that the judges' backgrounds, political affiliations, and extensive prior
association with President Mandela created an apprehension of bias. Id. at * 13-19, *27-5 1.
Complicating matters was the fact that the entire Constitutional Court had been appointed by
President Mandela as the nation's only leader since the adoption of the post-apartheid
constitution. Id. at *19. The Court reviewed international precedent on the standard for
questions of bias and the procedure for determining recusal applications. Id. at *55-78. The
Court agreed that the application for recusal was a "constitutional matter" that should be heard
before the whole court. Id. at *54. The Court decided that the facts as described did not support
recusal of the challenged judges under the applicable standard. Id. at * 121.
179. See Johann Kriegler, Speech, The Constitutional Court of South Africa, 36 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 361,365 (2003) (commenting on the comprehensive analysis undertaken in reaching
the decision in SARFU).
180. See SARFU, 1999 (7) BCLR 725 (CC), 1999 SACLR LEXIS 18, at *60-72
(considering the test for bias and the nature of the bias sufficient to support a finding of
reasonably apprehended bias).
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the "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" tests for questions of bias," l
the Court agreed that adoption of the reasonable suspicion test best served the
interest of protecting of public confidence in the judiciary. 8 2  The
Constitutional Court, however, preferred to word the standard in terms of an
"apprehension of bias" rather than a suspicion because of the risk of
misunderstanding associated with the latter term. 1
83
The next task for the Constitutional Court was to establish the scope of the
test and the facts to consider in arriving at a conclusion that a particular
apprehension was reasonable. The SARFU Court cited with approval the
comments of Canadian Justices L'Heureux-Dubd and McLachlin that analysis
of bias starts with the presumption that judges are capable and desirous of
judging controversies impartially.'14 Citing at length from Australian, English,
Canadian, and American court decisions and academic commentary, 185 many of
which are described and discussed above, the SARFU Court concluded:
The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would
on the correct facts reasonably apprehend that the judge... will not bring
an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, [meaning] ... a
mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of the
counsel. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed in the
light of the oath of office taken by the judges to administer justice without
fear or [favor] and their ability to carry out that oath by reason of their
training and experience. It must be assumed that they can disabuse their
minds of any irrelevant beliefs or predispositions.'
8 6
The Constitutional Court's comments have proven to be quite influential
overseas 187 as a concise and detailed summary of contemporary recusal policy.
The SARFU decision is also a unique instance of a high court deciding
recusal motions en banc prior to argument on the underlying dispute.'88 The
181. See id at *59-60 (commenting on the development of alternative tests for bias in
England and the Commonwealth countries).
182. See id. at *60 (declaring the appropriate test to be applied in South African courts).
183. See id. at *62-63 (stating a preference for apprehension terminology and noting that
the two terms have been recognized by numerous other courts as interchangeable).
184. See id. at *64-65 (citing R.D.S. v. The Queen, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 (L'Heureux-Dub6
& McLachlin, JJ., concurring)) (expressing the presumption ofjudicial propriety that underlies
any bias analysis).
185. See id. at *66-77 (surveying various international commentary on application of
recusal standards).
186. Id. at *78-79.
187. See Kriegler, supra note 179, at 365 (noting that the Constitutional Court's decision
in SARFU has been cited in the House of Lords and other foreign courts).
188. See Pres. of the Rep. of S. Afr. v. S. Afr. Rugby Football Union, 1999 (7) BCLR 725
(CC), 1999 SACLR LEXIS 18, at * 15 (calling the application for recusal unprecedented).
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SARFU Court noted that judges in South Africa may properly determine
recusal challenges individually, 8 9 but that a special responsibility attaches to
motions to the Constitutional Court because of its role as the ultimate court of
appeal. 19° Because a judge who sits in a case from which he should be
disqualified creates a reasonable apprehension of bias and, in doing so, acts in
violation of the Constitution of South Africa, the justices of the Constitutional
Court concluded that the entire Court had a duty to ensure that recusal motions
were properly decided.' 9' According to SARFU, a recusal determination by the
full Court is appropriate when a reasonable apprehension of bias is alleged.1
92
E. Summary of Foreign Common Law Precedent
Preserving public confidence is a fundamental goal ofjudicial systems,1
93
so it should come as no surprise that recusal policy, which advances that goal
by protecting the appearance of impartiality, has developed similarly in many
countries. Although this Note's review of foreign guidance is by no means
exhaustive, 94 it is clear that certain common principles are found in the way
most modem common law systems address disqualification of judges.
Reviewing recusal policy overseas shows that in many ways the United States
Supreme Court is in the mainstream of common law standards, but differences
exist in terms of the procedure used by the courts to reach recusal decisions.
The overwhelming preference of courts for an objective test to apply to
questions of bias is evident from the domestic and foreign common law
precedent. Although the terminology used to describe the test varies in each
nation,' 9 the principle is the same in the United States as it is overseas: courts
189. See id. at *55 (explaining that "[j]udges have jurisdiction to determine applications for
their own recusal").
190. See id. at *55-56 (discussing the special circumstances implicated in recusal motions
to the Constitutional Court as the court of last resort for appellants).
191. See id. at *55 (addressing the constitutional implications for a judge who sits
improperly and other judges who sit in a panel with the disqualified judge).
192. See id. at *58-59 (reaching the conclusion that apprehension of bias cases must be
heard by the whole court).
193. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (documenting universal belief in the
importance ofjudicial impartiality).
194. See generally JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (Shimon
Shetreet & Jules Desch~nes eds., 1985) (surveying judicial independence in twenty-nine
nations).
195. See supra notes 110-17, 133-40, 159-65, 181-86 and accompanying text (surveying
the language used to describe recusal standards in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
South Africa).
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must assess the propriety of recusal from a neutral and independent
perspective. 196 Domestic and foreign courts also agree on many characteristics
attributed to the hypothetical observer, including the degree of familiarity with
the legal system' 97 and the absence of predetermined beliefs about judicial
impartiality. 198  What is clear is that, despite technical differences in the
descriptions, the standard applied by the United States Supreme Court is quite
similar to the standard applied by foreign common law courts.
In terms of recusal procedure, however, the differences between domestic
and international policy are more striking. Courts of last resort in Australia,
South Africa, and the United Kingdom all recognize the right of a petitioner to
seek review of a negative recusal decision by a single high court judge.199 The
timing of that review, however, is different in each case. In the United
Kingdom, the House of Lords reviewed a failure to recuse after the challenged
judge had participated and ruled in the underlying case.200 In Australia, the
High Court allowed the challenged judge to rule on the recusal motion and
provided for subsequent review before the full Court.20 1 In the Constitutional
Court of South Africa, the en banc review occurred even before the individual
judges had ruled on the recusal motions.20 2
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
Canada maintain that recusal determinations are properly left to the final
discretion of the challenged judge.20 3 In both of these Supreme Courts, no
procedure exists for review of a challenged judge's recusal decision.204 In all
five legal systems, however, the courts agree that the first decision on questions
of recusal properly lies with the judge whose impartiality is being questioned.20 5
196. See id. (describing the objective tests applied in foreign courts of last resort).
197. See supra notes 83-86, 163--64 and accompanying text (commenting on the extent of
legal knowledge attributed to the hypothetical reasonable observer).
198. See supra notes 119, 186 and accompanying text (expressing approval for a
presumption of impartiality).
199. See supra notes 144-49, 170-76, 188-92 and accompanying text (reviewing court
decisions supporting en banc review of recusal determinations).
200. See R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (In re Pinochet Ugarte) (No. 2),
[1999] 1 A.C. 119, 137 (H.L.) (ruling on Lord Hoffman's participation).
201. See Tilmouth & Williams, supra note 173, at 72 (explaining the circumstances
surrounding Justice Callinan's rejection of a recusal petition).
202. See Pres. of the Rep. of S. Afr. v. S. Afr. Rugby Football Union, 1999 (7) BCLR 725
(CC), 1999 SACLR LEXIS 18, at *120-21 (ruling on a motion to disqualify four of the Court's
justices).
203. See supra Part II.D and text accompanying notes 106-08 (describing recusal
procedure in the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada).
204. See id. (explaining the lack of a procedure for review of recusal decisions).
205. See supra notes 96, 107, 142, 168, 189 and accompanying text (indicating the role of
1828
DUCK DUCK RECUSE?
IV. Establishing a Clear Recusal Standard and Procedure for the
Supreme Court
The principles on which a number of foreign courts agree provide a
convenient starting point for modifying domestic recusal policy. The Supreme
Court's first step, however, does not require any reflection on foreign guidance.
Explaining the current system for deciding recusal challenges will help the
Court alleviate many of the challenges it faces today.2°6 Simply codifying the
current standard and procedure will reassure the public that the Court is not
reinventing the recusal process as new cases arise.20 7 By modifying their policy
to reflect foreign common law precedent, however, the Justices can
dramatically improve the way the Supreme Court decides recusal motions.
A. Proposing a Standard for Questions of Bias
Finding the right standard for questions of bias requires a delicate
balancing of competing interests. Apply too strict a standard, and judicial
resolution becomes expensive and time-consuming; apply too relaxed a
standard, and judicial solutions arrive under the cloud of unfairness.208 In the
Supreme Court, the outer limit of the appropriate standard is dictated by 28
U.S.C. § 455(a).2 °9 Under that federal recusal statute, judges and courts must
apply an objective standard to questions of bias.210  Whatever modified
standard the Court adopts, it must support the general principle that recusal is
required whenever "impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
2 11
the challenged judge in recusal decisions).
206. See Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, House
Committee on Government Reform, and Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Minority Member,
House Committee on the Judiciary, to Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, United States
Supreme Court 4 (Jan. 30,2004) [hereinafter Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman] (stating that
public confidence in the Supreme Court could erode without a consistent recusal procedure),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/ hdocs/docs/scotus/waxrehnql30041tr.pdf (last visited
Aug. 31, 2005).
207. See Leahy Letter, supra note 5 (seeking an explanation of what procedures exist for
Supreme Court recusal).
208. See Frank, supra note 3, at 608 (discussing the "conflict of values" that accompanies
the adoption of a recusal standard).
209. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000) (requiring recusal for a reasonable apprehension of
bias); see also supra Part II.B (explaining and discussing § 455(a)).
210. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351,6355
(describing the proposed legislation as adopting an objective standard).
211. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
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The reason objective tests have proved so popular is because they enhance
the appearance of impartiality while protecting judges from frivolous
challenges. By requiring recusal whenever circumstances would lead a
reasonable observer to doubt a Justice's impartiality, § 455 focuses on the
public's view of the judiciary.212 At the same time, requiring that an
apprehension be reasonable and based on demonstrable facts ensures that
Justices only recuse themselves when doing so is truly necessary to protect the
appearance of impartiality.
Despite the widespread application of an objective standard in modem
213foreign and domestic courts, the reasonable apprehension test met with some
criticism when initially proposed in the United States. Most of the criticism
arose because the reasonable apprehension test imposes more stringent
requirements on judges than does a subjective standard and lowers the bar for
petitioners to move successfully for recusal of a particular judge.1 4 Some
commentators suggested that a strict objective standard would produce a spike
in frivolous recusal applications and actually hurt public confidence in the
overall impartiality of judges. 215 At the Supreme Court level, critics have
asserted, a less deferential standard creates an increased risk of equally divided
courts and undecided constitutional questions.21 6
The best way to address fears of judge-shopping and frivolous recusal
motions is to clearly define the reasonable apprehension standard.217 Currently,
the terminology employed by both federal and state courts to describe the
standard varies widely.218 The Supreme Court's own decisions reveal an
212. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859-60 (1988)
(explaining § 455(a)'s primary purpose of promoting public confidence); H.R. REP. No. 93-
1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355 (commenting on the desire to
promote public confidence in the judicial process).
213. See supra notes 110-17, 133-40, 159-65, 181-86 and accompanying text (surveying
the language used to describe recusal standards in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
South Africa).
214. See Lijeberg, 486 U.S. at 858 n.7 (stating that the 1974 amendment to § 455 was
intended to broaden the grounds on which recusal would be granted);Note, supra note 5, at 745
(calling the modified test stricter than the preamendment version).
215. See Note, supra note 5, at 747 (describing the concerns expressed by critics of an
objective recusal standard, including excessive recusal and overwhelming the Court system).
216. See id. at 748-49 (weighing the problems raised by Supreme Court recusal against the
benefits of a more stringent test for judges).
217. See id. at 747 (noting that the solution to excessively harsh application of the
objective standard and frivolous challenges to judges rests in clarity and development of the
law).
218. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 80, pt. l.IV.A, at 15 (stating that "every circuit has
adopted some version of the reasonable person standard"); Abramson, supra note 90, at 72-73
(listing the "numerous variations" of the reasonable person standard developed and applied by
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inconsistent description of the applicable standard.219  Ambiguous
characterization of the reasonable apprehension standard creates uncertainty
about how a judge will apply the test in a given case.22 °
The Supreme Court needs to promulgate a recusal policy that permanently
establishes the meaning of the reasonable apprehension test. An appropriate
statement of the test would be whether a fair-minded and knowledgeable
person, with a full appreciation of the facts and circumstances in question,
would reasonably apprehend that the challenged Justice might not act
impartially in deciding the matter before the court. This test embodies the
moderate, objective standard prevalent in foreign courts,2 2 1 and incorporates the
Canadian belief that the reasonableness requirement attaches to both the
hypothetical observer and the apprehension of bias.222
Completing the improvement process requires the Supreme Court to
comprehensively define the terminology used in the standard. The first part of
the proposed standard explains that judges must assess questions of bias from
the viewpoint of a "fair-minded and knowledgeable" hypothetical observer.
That statement implies an individual who is aware of the ethical obligations
placed on judges and who is aware that judges seek to protect the image of
impartiality. 223  At the same time, the "fair-minded and knowledgeable"
observer is a healthy skeptic224 who is reluctant to defer automatically to a
state courts).
219. See Litekyv. United States, 510 U.S. 540,552 (1994) (describing the test as whether
"there exists a genuine question concerning a judge's impartiality"); id. at 558 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (describing the test as whether "it appears that [the judge] harbors an aversion,
hositility, or disposition of a kind that a fair-minded person could not set aside"); Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860-61 (1988) (describing the test as whether "a
reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge would have
actual knowledge" of facts that would give him an interest).
220. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6352
(stating that the lack of clarity of previous ethical standards caused problems in application).
221. See discussion supra Part III.E (noting the widespread use of an objective standard for
questions of bias).
222. See R.D.S. v. The Queen, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 531 (Cory & lacobucci, JJ.,
concurring) (discussing the two-pronged objective test for an apprehension of bias).
223. See id. at 503 (L'Heureux-Dubd & McLachlin, JJ., concurring) (expressing the
presumption ofjudicial propriety that underlies any bias analysis); Pres. of the Rep. of S. Aft. v.
S. Afr. Rugby Football Union, 1999 (7) BCLR 725 (CC), 1999 SACLR LEXIS 18, at *64-65
(approving of the presumption expressed in R.D.S.); Abramson, supra note 90, at 70 (stating
that a judge's unwillingness to sit in a case in which her impartiality might be questioned is
presumed in reviewing a motion to recuse).
224. See In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that "drawing all
inferences favorable to the honesty and care of the judge" would undermine the appearance
standard).
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225judge's decision. The next part of the proposed standard explains that the
hypothetical observer has a "full appreciation of the facts and circumstances in
question." In other words, the bystander has both a full knowledge of the facts
giving rise to the recusal challenge,226 and a deeper, contextual understanding
of the circumstances that created the apprehension of bias.227
Finally, the standard explains that recusal is required only when the
reasonable person apprehends that the judge "will not act impartially in
deciding the matter before the Court." In this context, impartiality means that
each Justice must bring to the case an open mind to the evidence and arguments
presented in the case, and that the Justice is not inappropriately predisposed to a
certain result.228 By extension, recusal is not required when a party merely
229
fears an adverse decision, or that the Justice will not bring a totally blank
slate to the bench.230 In other words, recusal is appropriate if external factors
would cause the reasonable observer to fear that a Justice will possess a
231wrongful "aversion or hostility" to one argument or party.
B. Improving the Supreme Court's Recusal Determination Procedure
Justice Robert Jackson noted that the absence of a uniform practice for
recusal made review of an individual Justice's recusal determinations a difficult
225. See id. (noting the lack of deference of the general public to questions of judicial
bias).
226. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860-61 (1988)
(stating that the test for apparent bias is applied from the perspective of a person "knowing all
the circumstances"); Abramson, supra note 90, at 60 (observing that the need for proof is "vital"
in apparent bias challenges).
227. See supra notes 117, 165 and accompanying text (describing the social knowledge
charged to the hypothetical observer).
228. See SARFU, 1999 (7) BCLR 725 (CC), 1999 SACLR LEXIS 18, at *78-79
(describing the expectation that a Justice will bring "a mind open to persuasion by the evidence
and the submissions of the counsel").
229. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1994) (declaring that not every
"unfavorable disposition" towards a case is bias).
230. See id. at 552 (rejecting the requirement of"child-like innocence" by judges); Frank,
supra note 1, at 48 (explaining that "Justices are strong-minded [individuals], and on the subject
matters that come before them, they do have propensities; the course of decisions cannot be
accounted for in any other way").
231. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 558 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See id. at 552-56 (affirming the
existence of an extrajudicial source factor in determining questions of apparent bias); MARvIN
COMISKEY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY-SELECTION, COMPENSATION, ETt-cs, AND




task.232 This Note's proposed standard for questions of bias will increase
consistency in judicial disqualification, but the lack of an established procedure
will continue to undermine public confidence in recusal. Developing a
concrete recusal procedure for the Supreme Court will enhance transparency to
the parties, provide a means for review of individual decisions, and protect
against erroneous disqualification.
The dominant procedural model for deciding questions of bias in the
United States and overseas provides for determination by the challenged
judge.233 The primary benefit of the individual determination model is that the
person with the best knowledge of the facts is the person who resolves whether
the circumstances support recusal.234 Individual determination may also reduce
the number of recusal "fishing expeditions" because parties will be reluctant to
approach an individual Justice with weak evidentiary support for a
disqualification motion. The single-judge procedure also enhances judicial
efficiency because it avoids prolonged fact-finding hearings before recusal
* 235decisions. Furthermore, research on judicial practices suggests that
individual determination may actually result in more frequent recusal of
Justices than other methods.236
On the other hand, asking a challenged Justice to rule on a motion to
recuse puts that Justice in a precarious position.237 First, because a Justice is
expected to recuse himself sua sponte if there is a reasonable apprehension of
bias,238 a successful motion to recuse requires the Justice to admit that he failed
232. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 897,
897 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (commenting on the lack of uniform practice and
authoritative standards for recusal), denying reh 'g of 325 U.S. 161.
233. See CRANE & BROWN, supra note 106, § 4 Recusal, at 45 (describing the practice of
referring recusal motions to the challenged judge); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 80, pt.
1.VII.A, at 45 (noting that the weight of authority indicates that the challenged judge should
rule on recusal motions).
234. See Abramson, supra note 30, at 546 (stating that the judge's full knowledge of his
own circumstances provides a rationale for allowing the challenged judge to decide recusal
motions).
235. See Tilmouth & Williams, supra note 173, at 73 (noting that the High Court of
Australia had scheduled time for a hearing in connection with the recusal motion at issue in
Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (No. 2)).
236. See JONA GOLDSCHMIDT & JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, AM. JUDICATURE SOc'Y, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICAL PRACTICES AND ATrITUDES 1, 10-11
(1995) (discussing the tendency ofjudges to disqualify themselves in situations in which they
would not disqualify a peer).
237. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 2(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351,6352
(noting that the judge was often forced to decide recusal motions "at his peril").
238. See Abramson, supra note 90, at 70 ("To avoid the appearance of impropriety, the
judge should be the first to raise the issue by recusing in a particular case.").
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in the first instance to adhere to statutory and ethical requirements. 39 Second,
the image of a Justice ruling on his own recusal motion raises the specter of
self-interest as strongly as if the Justice was ruling on a case in which he has a
direct pecuniary interest. If the House of Lords's automatic disqualification
reasoning is taken to its logical conclusion,2 ° it is hard to distinguish a situation
when a judge is self-interested philanthropically from one where a judge is self-
interested ethically.
In the U.S. federal court system, appellate review is a statutory, not a
constitutional, right,241 although the circuit courts of appeal have jurisdiction
over most final or interlocutory rulings by the district courts.242 Another
problem with allowing the challenged Justice to rule on disqualification,
therefore, is that the moving party would have its recusal motion decided by a
single judge without any recourse for appellate review.243 In the context of
recusal, departure from the general presumption of appellate review undermines
public confidence by implying that a single Justice can unilaterally declare
himself fit to hear a case.
239. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994) (stating that recusal is
"required" under § 455 whenever impartiality might reasonably be questioned); Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 851 (1988) (finding that a judge's
disqualification was required irrespective of the judge's knowledge of the circumstances
creating the bias); ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, pmbl. (1990) (explaining that
when the Code uses the term "shall," as it does in the discretionary recusal provision, Canon 3E,
the text "intend[s] to impose binding obligations").
240. See R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (In re Pinochet Ugarte) (No. 2),
[2000] 1 A.C. 119, 132-35 (H.L.) (explaining that a judge is automatically disqualified
whenever he has an interest in the outcome of the case and asserting that a philanthropic interest
is sufficient to trigger automatic disqualification). But see David Robertson, The House of
Lords as a Political and Constitutional Court: Lessons from the Pinochet Case, in THE
PINOCHET CASE: A LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 141, at 25-31 (criticizing
the House of Lords automatic disqualification formula as an efficient but unworkable solution to
the problem of reprimanding a judicial colleague).
241. United States v. Young, 544 F.2d 415, 416 (1976).
242. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (2004) (establishing the appellate jurisdiction of the
federal circuit courts).
243. See Letter from Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, United States Supreme
Court, to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Jan. 26,
2004) [hereinafter Letter from Hon. William H. Rehnquist] (stating that there is no Court
procedure for review of an individual Justice's recusal determination), available at
http://news.flndlaw.com/ hdocs/docs/scotus/rehnquistl26041tr.html (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Although there is no constitutional guarantee, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 creates the presumption of available appellate review. 20 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 303.11 (1)(a) (3d ed. 1999).
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The second procedural model, and the one largely supported by critics of
the current Supreme Court procedure, 244 allows the full Court to hear recusal
applications. Much of the foreign common law precedent on recusal suggests
that such a procedure should be available to applicants.245 Full Court
determination ensures that the reasonableness of an apprehension of bias is
subject to review from multiple perspectives and from an emotional distance
not available to the single challenged Justice. 24 This procedure would enhance
transparency of the recusal process 247 and ensure that the Court does not violate
the due process right to a fair and impartial hearing of the party seeking
recusal.248
On the other hand, providing for en banc review could unnecessarily
burden the Court by requiring oral arguments or extensive motion practice
before any resolution of a recusal motion.249 That process could in turn distract
the Court from the serious and extensive judicial tasks that already fully occupy
its time and attention.20 En banc determination also risks inserting artificial
animosity into a collegial and respectful environmene 51 by asking Justices to
rule on the propriety of a colleague's conduct. Finally, determination by the
full Court may actually detract from the public appearance of impartiality in the
event that determination of recusal motions develops along ideological or
political lines.
In practice, the most effective procedure for deciding recusal motions
combines both individual determination by the challenged Justice and en banc
review. The Constitutional Court of South Africa's treatment of the recusal
244. See Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, supra note 206, at 4 (urging Chief Justice
Rehnquist to adopt a procedure which allowed for review of a Justice's recusal decision).
245. See supra Part III.E (discussing availability of en banc review of recusal
determinations in overseas courts).
246. See Abramson, supra note 90, at 71-72 (commenting on judges' intimate involvement
in the judicial process and their reluctance to self-censure).
247. See Abramson, supra note 30, at 561 (explaining that allowing a challenged judge to
decide a recusal motion "erodes the necessary public confidence in the integrity of a judicial
system").
248. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (noting that "[a] fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process"); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)
(declaring that due process is violated by subjecting an individual to a hearing before a judge
with a substantial interest in reaching a decision against that individual).
249. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the High Court of Australia's
scheduling of times for oral arguments on a recusal motion).
250. See THoMAs G. WALKER & LEE EPSTEiN, Thn SuPREmE COURT OF THE UNYED STATES
67-69 (1993) (describing the Court's growing caseload).
251. See Ginsburg, supra note 100, at 1033-36 (describing generally the collegial
atmosphere that exists among the Justices).
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motion in SARFU suggests a three-step procedure that could be applied in the
Supreme Court. 2 The first step for a party seeking recusal would be an initial,
private request to the challenged Justice describing the facts and arguments
supporting the party's apprehension of bias. This would allow a Justice to
"save face" by voluntarily recusing himself in the event that he had overlooked
circumstances giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The next step
for a party seeking recusal would be a formal written motion addressed to the
Justice in question and providing the grounds for recusal. Although the chance
of success at this stage would be slim given the Justice's prior rejection of the
motion, the possibility of a public appeal would increase the pressure on the
Justice and provide the Justice's colleagues on the Court the opportunity to
offer guidance on the decision.
The final step in the recusal process would be an appeal for en banc
review of an individual Justice's decision not to recuse. This would not be an
appeal of right for the party seeking disqualification. Under this proposal, the
Court would apply a procedure similar to that used to grant writ of certiorari to
decide when review of disqualification would be appropriate. The decision to
grant en banc review could be by affirmative vote of one-third of the
unchallenged Justices or left to the discretion of the Chief Justice in his role as
chief administrator of the U.S. court system.
This proposed procedure would help defuse public uncertainty over
determination methods and ensure that a party whose recusal motion was
denied by a single Justice would have a means to receive judicial review of the
decision. 253 This proposal also minimizes the risk of judge-shopping by
severely limiting en banc review of recusal decision to cases where several
members of the Court felt that one of its Justices had made a clear error.
Finally, the proposal reduces interference with the Court's primary
responsibilities by allowing the individual most familiar with the facts to make
254the first ruling on the recusal motion.
Although the three-step proposal for a Supreme Court recusal procedure
will help alleviate many of the problems in the disqualification process, the
predicament of affirmation by an equally divided court still remains. One
252. See Pres. of the Rep. of S. Aft. v. S. Afr. Rugby Football Union, 1999 (7) BCLR 725
(CC), 1999 SACLR LEXIS 18, at *14--15, *20-2 1, *51-52 (describing the process by which the
petitioner brought the recusal issue before the court and the court's eventual collective
response).
253. See Letter from Hon. William H. Rehnquist, supra note 243 (stating that there is no
Court procedure for review of an individual Justice's recusal determination).
254. See Abramson, supra note 30, at 546 (stating that the judge's full knowledge of his or




solution to this problem applied by other courts of last resort is designation of
replacement Justices who could sit in a case from which a regular Justice is
disqualified.255 Some domestic scholars have suggested replacements for
recused Justices in connection with petitions for certiorari.256 The chiefjudge
of either the D.C. Circuit or the referring circuit court, or a retired Supreme
Court Justice, could be viable candidates to serve as a recusal replacement.257
V. Application and Conclusion
Application to Justice Scalia's duck-hunting trip with Vice President
Cheney presents a convenient test for this Note's proposed changes to recusal
policy. In that context, the issue presented is whether a fair-minded and
knowledgeable person, with a full appreciation of the facts and circumstances
in question, would reasonably apprehend that Justice Scalia might not act
impartially in deciding the matter before the court. On the basis of the details
provided in Justice Scalia's memorandum, this Note concludes that the facts do
not support a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The fair-minded and knowledgeable individual is generally aware of the
ethical requirements imposed by federal law and the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct.258 In this particular case, the hypothetical observer brings a balanced
approach to the issue of Justice Scalia's judicial tendencies. 259 In accordance
with the proposed standard, the reasonable observer in this case is also imbued
with complete awareness of the facts surrounding the Sierra Club's recusal
255. See SARFU, 1999 SACLR LEXIS 18, at *76-77 (discussing the ability of the
President of South Africa to appoint acting replacement justices to the Constitutional Court);
Simone Rozes, Independence ofJudges of the Court ofJustice of the European Communities, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, supra note 194, at 504 (commenting on
the availability of a predetermined tiebreaker judge).
256. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari
Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REV. 657, 673-75 (1996) (arguing that congressional authorization for
a substitute Justice provision could alleviate problems created by disqualification of Supreme
Court justices).
257. See id. at 673,675 (suggesting the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Circuit or
a retired Supreme Court Justice as potential recusal substitutes).
258. See discussion supra Part II.B (describing the ethical requirements imposed on judges
by federal statute and the ABA).
259. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913,928-29 (2004) (Scalia, J., as
single Justice) (stating that the question of recusal must be assessed from the view of a person
who believed in Justice Scalia's impartiality prior to his hunting trip with the Vice President).
But see Maureen Dowd, Editorial, Quid Pro Quack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at DI I
(alluding to the 2000 election controversy and commenting that Justice Scalia's decision not to
recuse was unsurprising because the Justice had "put Dick Cheney in the White House").
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motion. 26°  The factual knowledge attributed to the hypothetical observer
includes at least the details of the travel and boarding arrangements, the extent
of interaction between the two men while in Louisiana, and the value of any
benefits incurred by Justice Scalia.261
The most difficult question, and the one most critical to resolving the
recusal motion, is whether to imbue the hypothetical observer with an
understanding of the distinction between suits against government employees in
their official capacity and suits against government employees as private
individuals.262 The Sierra Club's recusal motion required Justice Scalia to
decide whether an observer would reasonably fear that the Justice's experience
in Louisiana might interfere with his ability to impartially consider the
arguments presented. Any determination of whether such an apprehension
would be reasonable must take into consideration what is at stake in the
particular suit before the Court.2 63 If that was not the case, the implication
would be that an observer is equally likely to apprehend bias in a case alleging
graft or murder as in a case alleging violation of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act.264 Although still unlikely, it is more probable that a Supreme
Court Justice would protect the financial or liberty interests of a social
acquaintance 265 than ignore the law to avoid a friend's political
embarrassment.266
In other words, the extent of Justice Scalia's interaction with Vice
President Cheney must be sufficient to reach the higher threshold of apparent
260. See supra note 226-27 and accompanying text (describing the knowledge prong of the
proposed standard for questions of apparent bias).
261. See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 914 (noting that consideration of bias must occur in light of
the facts as they existed).
262. See id. at 916-20 (explaining the distinction between official action and private action
cases).
263. Concluding that the standard for apprehending bias in a private suit against a
government official is the same as in an official capacity case could have staggering implications
for recusal of Justices. During the October 2002 Term, for example, the Supreme Court
considered 61 cases in which former Attorney General John Ashcroft was a named party. See
536 U.S. ix (2004) (listings cases in which Attorney General Ashcroft was named as a party);
537 U.S. xxxviii-xxxix (2004) (same). If the standard for questions of bias did not
acknowledge the distinction between personal and official capacity, a Justice with a social
relationship with Mr. Ashcroft might be disqualified from all of those cases.
264. See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 919 & n.1 (mentioning that the issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the Federal Advisory Committee Act could be construed to authorize
discovery from the Vice President).
265. See id. at 916 (stating that friendship is a ground for recusal when "the personal
fortune or the personal freedom" of the friend is at stake in the case).
266. See id. at 920 (declaring that "political consequences" are not sufficient to convert an
official action suit into a private action suit for the purpose of recusal).
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bias necessary to support a reasonable apprehension in an official action suit, or
the evidence must show that the risk of political damage was significant enough
to treat the case as a personal action suit. In this case, however, the nature of
the duck-hunting trip does not show sufficient personal interest on the part of
Justice Scalia to reasonably apprehend bias in an official action suit against
Vice President Cheney. For that reason, it is not reasonable to think that a fully
informed, fair-minded, and knowledgeable observer would apprehend bias on
the part of Justice Scalia, and the Justice was correct in denying the motion to
recuse.
Under the modified procedure for addressing recusal questions proposed
in Part lV.B of this Note, the Sierra Club could apply to the full Court for
review of Justice Scalia's determination. It is unlikely that the Court would
grant such a request. Chief Justice Rehnquist described the backlash against
Justice Scalia as "ill considered, 2 67 and Justice Ginsburg, although not directly
addressing the correctness of his decision, implied that Justice Scalia's situation
presented a difficult question.268 The procedure proposed here suggests that
full Court review of recusal determination is reserved for situations when there
is a compelling reason for intervention.269 When reasonable minds may differ
on recusal, as appears to be the case with Justice Scalia's decision, there is not
clear evidence of error to support the Court's intervention.
It would be unreasonable to expect that any standard and procedure for
recusal in the Supreme Court would guarantee the most popular result in every
situation. The proposed changes made here are intended to advance the goals
of uniformity and clarity while ensuring that parties are protected from any
abuse of discretion. Solidifying the applicable standard for questions of bias
ensures that every recusal challenge is dealt with according to the same
principles, and that parties will have confidence in the result and how it was
reached. Establishing a concrete procedure for making and reviewing recusal
determinations allows the Court to protect parties from the risk ofjudicial abuse
and the appearance of bias. The hope is that the modifications proposed here
will ensure that recusal of Justices returns to being a process to improve, rather
than hinder, the appearance of impartiality in the Supreme Court.
267. Letter from Hon. William H. Rehnquist, supra note 243.
268. See Ginsburg, supra note 100, at 1039 (explaining that Justice Scalia's recusal
question would have been an "easy call" at the appeals court level, but indicating that the unique
situation in the Supreme Court presented a more difficult decision).
269. See discussion supra Part IV.B (proposing a modified procedure for reviewing recusal
determinations by single Justices).
1839

